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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MONICA GILLETT, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
VS. ] 
JAMES ANTHONY GILLETT, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
1 CASE NO. 880413-CA 
1 PRIORITY NO. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A., 
section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff, a New York resident, filed an action in 3rd District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah to enforce the terms of a non-judicial 
Separation Agreement entered into by the parties in 1970 and amended 
by the parties in 1977. This appeal stems from the trial Court 
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial Court's 
earlier denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to the 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Under Conflicts of Law, what jurisdiction's law (New York or 
Utah) is to be applied by the Utah trial court in determining the 
issues in this case. 
2. Is it erroneous for a Utah Court to entertain a Motion for 
Reconsideration when there is no statutory basis for such a motion. 
3. Was the trial court's granting of Summary Judgment erroneous 
based upon the facts and law of this case. 
4. Is the enforcement of permanent alimony, via contract, 
against the public policy of the laws of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff/Respondent and Defendant/Appellant were married on 
May 7, 1938 in Banstead, England. On March 31, 1970 the parties 
entered into a "Separation Agreement" in the State of New York 
(R: pg 13-17). On April 28, 1970 the parties were granted a Decree of 
Divorce (R: pg 10-12) in Juarez, Mexico after some 32 years of 
marriage. 
On March 31, 1970, prior to the Mexican Divorce, the parties 
entered into a "Separation Agreement" in the State of New York. Among 
the terms of the "Separation Agreement" there was a provision that 
the "Separation Agreement" was not to merge into any decree or 
judgment but should survive and be forever binding and conclusive on 
the parties. (R: pg 15-16) At the time of the parties separation all 
of the children of the marriage were of legal age. The Mexican Decree 
of Divorce incorporated by reference the terms of the "Separation 
Agreement" but specifically stated that the agreement did not merge 
into the Decree.(R: pg 12) 
Under paragraph 5 of the "Separation Agreement," Defendant 
agreed to pay to the Plaintiff "the sum of £650.00 per month, payable 
on the first day of each month, the first payment to be made on the 
date of this agreement. In addition, he (Defendant/Appellant) shall 
pay the monthly rental of an apartment or dwelling occupied by the 
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second party (Plaintiff/Respondent)." (R: pg 15) 
Defendant/Appellant paid these amounts regularly to the 
Plaintiff through approximately July i, 1977. In 1977, 
Plaintiff/Respondent brought an action, in the State of New York to 
recover from the Defendant/Appellant arrearages under the "Separation 
Agreement" accruing from its inception through the month of July, 
1977. In resolution of the matter, the parties, on September 23, 
1977, entered into an "Amended Separation Agreement." (R: pg 18-20) 
Under the terms of the "Amended Separation Agreement," entered into 
by the parties, Defendant/Appellant acknowledged that he was in 
arrears in the support payments through September 1, 1977 in the 
amount of $4,000.00, further; that a judgment could be entered in 
favor of the Plaintiff/Respondent for such amount, further; that the 
original "Separation Agreement" be amended, as to paragraph 5 only, 
to read: "That the husband shall pay to the wife $800.00 per month, 
$650.00 for her support and maintenance and $150.00 for her rental." 
Defendant/Appellant continued paying Plaintiff/Respondent 
$800.00 per month until approximately May, 1985 at which time he 
decreased his payments as follows: 
May, 1985 $400.00 
June, 1985 $540.00 
July, 1985 $800.00 
August, 1985 through 
and including August, 
1986 $650.00/month 
Defendant/Appellant ceased making payments with the month of 
September, 1986. From the inception of the "Separation Agreement" 
through August, 1986 Defendant/Appellant has paid 
Plaintiff/Respondent approximately $142,290.00. 
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In addition, in approximately 1972 Plaintiff received 1/2 of the 
net equity from the sale of the parties' marital residence in Fulton, 
New York, 
In addition, Defendant/Appellant has, throughout the years since 
the signing of the "Separation Agreement", contributed at a minimum 
$12,000.00 to the Plaintiff's support. (R: pg 106-108) 
At the time of the parties' Mexican Divorce in 1970, Plaintiff 
was not working and basically had few or no marketable skills. 
Throughout the post-divorce years Plaintiff/Respondent went to 
college (paid for by the Defendant/Respondent) and became a nurse. 
Plaintiff/Respondent has actively engaged in the nursing profession, 
since approximately 1972, working regularly and earning a regular 
income. 
At the time of the signing of the "Separation Agreement" both 
the Plaintiff/Respondent and the Defendant/Appellant resided in the 
State of New York. At the time of the signing of the "Amended 
Separation Agreement" the Plaintiff/Respondent resided in the State 
of New York and the Defendant/Appellant resided in the State of 
Washington. On or about August 20, 1986 Plaintiff initiated an action 
in the 3rd District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, by way of a 
summons and complaint (R: pg 2-24), to enforce several of the 
provisions of the March, 1970 "Separation Agreement" and October, 
1977 "Amended Separation Agreement" and, of particular importance, to 
enforce the alimony/support provisions and obtain a judgment against 
the Defendant for alleged arrearages. At the time of the initiation 
of Plaintiff/Respondent's action in 3rd District Court the 
Plaintiff/Respondent resided in the State of New York and the 
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Defendant/Appellant resided in the State of Utah. 
Defendant/Appellant answered the Complaint and raised numerous 
affirmative defenses (R: pg 25-28). On or about November 21, 1986 
Plaintiff moved for Summary Judgment. The Court, by way of its 
January 2, 1987 Order (R: pg 60-62), denied Summary Judgment ruling 
that there was ambiguity in the Separation Agreement and Amended 
Separation Agreement concerning the duration of the Defendant's 
obligation to pay Plaintiff. The matter was set for trial on January 
5, 1988. On or about October 19, 1987 Plaintiff/Respondent filed a 
"Motion for Reconsideration" (R: pg 71-76) of the Court's January 2, 
1987 Order denying Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion. On November 
30, 1987 the Court heard Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and 
pursuant thereto, reversed itself and granted Plaintiff's original 
Motion for Summary Judgment.(R: pg 100-101) Defendant filed 
objections to the subsequent Proposed Findings and Order (R: pg 
103-105) as well as a Motion for Amendment of Judgment or Relief from 
Order. (R: pg 109-113) The Court held a hearing on Defendant's 
Objections and Motion for Amendment of Judgment or Relief from 
Judgment on May 2, 1988. Defendant/Appellant's Motions were denied 
(Rz pg 117-118 and 141-144) and Defendant/Appellant appeals 
therefrom. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Under Conflicts of Law, since Utah has the most substantial 
interests in resolving this matter, Utah Law must govern in deciding 
the issues presented by this case. 
2. Under Utah law there is no such creature as a Motion for 
Reconsideration and the Court's entertaining such a motion 
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circumvents the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Appellate Procedure 
Rules. 
3. The facts of the case and the legal issues presented to the 
trial court were such that the granting of Summary Judgment was 
inappropriate. 
4. Enforcement of permanent alimony, via contract and not 
judicially mandated, is against the public policy of the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
This case involves issues stemming from a "Separation Agreement" 
and "Amended Separation Agreement" executed in the State of New York; 
a Mexican Divorce; a Plaintiff/Respondent who has always been a 
resident of New York; a Defendant/Appellant who has been, throughout 
the coarse of events, a resident of New York, Washington, and Utah, 
and; a Plaintiff/Respondent who chose to voluntarily initiate a legal 
action in the State of Utah. 
With the broad nation flavor of this case apparent the threshold 
issue becomes what jurisdiction's law is to be applied in deciding 
the issues presented in this case. 
There is no dispute on the part of the parties involved in this 
action that the issues incumbent in this case sound strictly in the 
nature of contract. We have a "Separation Agreement" and "Amended 
Separation Agreement" which are specifically not merged in the Decree 
of Divorce. Thus it is clear that the interpretation of these 
agreements must be dealt with under the laws of contracts. 
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Under the Restatement of La* 2nd, Conflicts of La*, section 186, 
it is stated: 
"Issues in contract are determined by the law chosen by the 
parties in accordance with the rule of section 187 (Law of 
State Chosen by Parties) and otherwise by the law selected 
in accordance with the rule of section 188 (Law governing 
in absence of effective choice by the parties)." 
Since the parties two agreements are silent as to the law that 
will govern the agreements' interpretation, then the rule set down in 
section 188 of the Restatement must be followed: 
"(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to 
an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the 
state which, with respect to that issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the transaction and the 
parties...." 
Defendant/Appellant asserts that Utah has the most significant 
relationship to the transaction and the parties for the following 
reasons: 
A. The agreements, while executed in New York, involved 
individuals who lived in various parts of the United States 
throughout the years. This was contemplated by the parties at the 
inception of the agreements, based upon Defendant/Appellant's history 
of "job hopping" and in fact was born out when the "Amended 
Separation Agreement" was signed at which time Defendant/Appellant 
was a resident of the State of Washington. As such, the State of New 
York really has no interests in the parties. 
B. While the original "Separation Agreement" was entered into 
to comply with Section 170(6) of the Domestic Relations Law of the 
State of New York (R: pg 13), the sole purpose of doing such was 
"...in the event that either party subsequently desires to initiate a 
proceeding under said statute...." (R: pg 13) As it turned out, 
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neither party initiated an action under Section 170(6) of the 
Domestic Relations Law of the State of New York, however, chose to 
obtain a Mexican Divorce. As such, the State of New York really has 
no interest in the contract or provisions of its laws. 
C. The Mexican Divorce Decree merely states that: 
"THIRD:- It is approved and confirmed in all its parts the 
Separation Agreement executed on March 31, 1970 in Oswego, 
New York, United States of America, is hereby made a part 
of this decree, as though herein set forth in full, but is 
not merged in it, but survives the same and the parties 
thereto are hereby ordered to comply with it on its terms 
at all times and places." 
As such, Mexico really has no interests in the parties or 
the Agreement. 
D. The Defendant/Appellant resided in the State of Utah at the 
time that Plaintiff/Respondent initiated the above captioned action 
in Utah. Further, Plaintiff/Respondent, a resident of the State of 
New York, thrust the enforcement of the agreements upon the Utah 
Courts and availed herself of the Utah Courts to seek her remedies 
though she was not a resident of this state and though she could 
have, perhaps more easily, initiated an action in her home state of 
New York. As such, it seems most apparent that at this juncture the 
State of Utah is the state which, with respect to the issues 
presented, has the most significant relationship to the transaction 
and the parties. 
However, for arguments sake, if this Court were to determine 
that New York law was to be applied in resolving the issues at stake, 
it is interesting to note that New York law apparently sides with the 
arguments made by the Defendant/Appellant. 
The key New York case on the issues presented in this case is 
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the case of CHRISTIAN v. CHRISTIAN, 365 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y., 1977). In 
that case the New York Court established the following view on 
"Separation Agreements": 
"Said Court was of the view, however, that the portion of 
the agreement...was so unconscionable as to be 
unenforceable." (Pg. 854-855) 
"...over the years, an unconscionable bargain has been 
regarded as one 'such as no [person] in his [or her] senses 
and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as 
no honest and fair [person] would accept on the other' 
(HUME v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406, 411, 10 S.Ct. 134, 136,33 L 
Ed. 393; 1889), the inequality being 'so strong and 
manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the 
judgment of any [person] of common sense.' (MANDEL v. 
LIEBMAN, 303 N.Y. 88, 94, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152) 
Unconscionable conduct is something of which equity takes 
cognizance, when warranted." (Pg. 855) 
"If voidable, such an agreement may be set aside under 
principles of equity in an action in which such relief is 
sought in a cause of action or by way of affirmative 
defense." (Pg. 855) 
"there is strict surveillance of all transactions between 
married persons, especially separation agreements.... 
Equity is so zealous in this respect that a separation 
agreement may be set aside on grounds that would be 
insufficient to vitiate an ordinary contract. these 
principles in mind, courts have thrown their cloak of 
protection about separation agreements and made it their 
business, when confronted, to see to it that they are 
arrived at fairly and equitably...and to set aside or 
refuse to enforce those born of and subsisting in 
inequity." 
This view was most recently reaffirmed in the case of PENNISE v. 
PENNISE, 466 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y., 1983): 
"Although as a general rule, a person is bound by what he 
or she signs, agreements between spouses are subject to 
closer judicial scrutiny than ordinary contracts." (Pg. 
633) 
"For the reasons that follow, this court...concludes that 
the CHRISTIAN rule- namely that an agreement which is 
unconscionable when made will not be enforced- continues to 
apply to marital property agreements." (Pg. 634) 
Thus even applying New York law the subject Separation 
Agreements are on their faces, as Defendant/Appellant argues, 
unconscionable and need to be looked at in further detail and 
possibly denied enforcement. 
POINT II 
Defendant/Appellant's legal Counsel has not been able to find 
any authority in the Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Utah Case 
law which condones, identifies or acknowledges the existence of a 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
The nearest creature which counsel can identify is a motion 
under Rule 59 or 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure or an 
Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to Rules 5(a) of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. 
For a court to entertain a motion called a Motion for 
Reconsideration is asking the court to step outside its 
jurisdictional boundaries and act as it own appeal court. The 
factual case presented in this case is especially repugnant due to 
the fact that the motion was not brought by the Plaintiff/Respondent 
until some ten (10) months after the originally ruling of the Court, 
obviously after the time limit for all other avenues available to 
opposing counsel had closed. 
Further, the court should note that the very same judge who 
entertained Plaintiff/Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and 
granted Summary Judgment under such motion, Judge James S. Sawaya, 
recently ruled that such a motion (Motion for Reconsideration) does 
not exist. (See Order attached hereto as Addendum) 
POINT III 
In light of the facts and issues stated to this point in this 
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brief, and in light of the pleadings and affidavits filed in the case 
at the trial court level, the Court's granting of summary judgment 
was highly inappropriate. 
It is generally held in Utah law that disposition of issues by 
the trial court by way of summary judgment are highly disfavored. 
(SEE: NELLS v. WALKER BANK it TRUST, 590 P2d 1261; Utah, 1979) 
The Court in its January 20, 1987 Order (R: pg 60-62) determined 
that there was a factual present which could only by resolved by 
parol evidence. After this order was entered nothing further of a 
factual nature was presented to the Court by either party that would 
have dissipated this factual issue found to exist by the Court. 
Defendant/Appellant contends that this factual issue still exists 
today. 
POINT IV 
The trial court had the authority to interpret the terms of the 
contracts (Separation Agreements) where the language was uncertain or 
ambiguous. (SEE: LAND v. LAND, 605 P2d 1248; Utah, 1980) 
Defendant/Appellant contends that the terms of both agreements 
are uncertain and ambiguous in the respect that neither specifies the 
length of time for which Defendant was required to make spousal 
support payments. Plaintiff would argue that Defendant's obligation 
continues in perpetuity, however, this does not constitute an 
equitable interpretation of the agreement in light of the underlying 
facts. 
The general rule is best set forth in a Washington case, ENDRES 
v. ENDRES, 380 P2d 873 (1963), wherein the court cited the general 
rule as: "...when a wife has the ability to earn a living, she is not 
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granted a perpetual lien of alimony on her divorced husband's future 
earnings. (SEE ALSO: LOCKHART v. LOCKHART, 259 P 385; Wash., 1927; 
MORGAN v. MORGAN, 369 P2d 516; Wash., 1962; WARNING v. WARNING, 247 
P2d 249; Wash., 1952) 
As to the issue of permanent alimony, the ENDRES case stated: 
"Whether permanent alimony will be allowed or disallowed, 
in addition to a property settlement, depends on the 
circumstances of each particular case. Under the facts of 
the case now before us, we do not hold that appellant is 
entitled to permanent alimony, because appellant being in 
the prime of life, can re-establish herself in the vocation 
she followed before marriage, or in some other useful or 
gainful occupation." 
The courts in Utah have consistently held that MThe most 
important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." 
(SEE: ENGLISH v. ENGLISH, 565 P2d 409; Utah, 1977; GRAMME v. GRAMME, 
587 P2d 144; Utah, 1978; FLETCHER v. FLETCHER, 615 P2d 1218; Utah, 
1980; JONES v. JONES, 700 P2d 1072; Utah, 1985) 
The guidelines governing alimony, established by the foregoing 
cases, derives its impetus from Utah Code Annotated, section 30-3-5, 
which is strictly equitable in nature. Historically, the power to 
grant alimony was not inherent in equity jurisdiction. It is of an 
equitable nature, but of statutory origin. (SEE: CLARK, The Law of 
Domestic Relations, section 14.1; 1968) 
Utah has recognized, with great antipathy, the trend in other 
jurisdictions, notably California, toward "rehabilitative awards" of 
alimony which provide for a gradual phase-out of alimony, the intent 
being merely to give the spouse time to become self-sufficient. (SEE: 
The Course of Change in Family Law. 1978-1979. 5 Fam. L. Rep.(B.N.A.) 
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4103; 1979) However, Utah dies acknowledge that rehabilitative 
alimony is within the discretion of the trial court, if it is in the 
best discretion of the trial court, exercised in accordance with the 
standards set by the Supreme Court in ENGLISH, GRAMME and JONES 
(Supra). 
As such, the interpretation of the Separation Agreements urged 
by the Plaintiff/Respondent (alimony in perpetuity) is clearly 
against the public policy of the State of Utah. 
Also, in light of this same philosophy in the Utah Courts 
regarding permanent alimony, Defendant/Appellant argues that the 
terms of the Separation Agreements, as to spousal support/alimony are 
unconscionable. (SEE: MARTIN v. FARBERf 510 A2d 608; Md. App., 1986) 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing arguments, Defendant/Appellant requests that 
this Court: 
1. Reverse the Courts granting of the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
2. Determine that Utah law is to be controlling over the issues 
in this case; 
3. Remand the case for further proceedings on the issues of 
ambiguity and unconscionability. 
4. for such further relief as the Court deems appropriate under 
the circumstances. 
Dated this 31st day of October, 1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned certifies that they mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this 1st day of 
November, 1988 to: 
LOUISE T. KNAUER, Attorney 
559 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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ADDENDUM 
SEPARATION AGESE><SN 
THIS ACaSSXSIT .raade in the County of Oswego and -tats cC 
-aw 1'ork, on the "'' ;' day of Karch, 1970, by and between J w S 
AivIKOiri GILLZTT residing at the City of Pulton, New York herein-
after referred to as the first party ar.i KOKICA CCLL2N-JOKES 
CILLZCT, residing at the City of Pulton, New York, hereinafter 
referred to as the second-party• 
WITNESSETH: 
*H2HIAS, the parties hereto were lawfully married on 
the 7th day of Xay, 1933 in Banstead, England, and 
KHEHEAS, there were four children born of the marriage, 
of the parties hereto, two children who are emancipated and two 
children, who are on the date of this agreement, unemencipated to 
wit: Antony Cuiett who was born Kay zy, 1951 and ^usan Gniett 
who was born April Zk9 1952; and 
VHSESAS, in consequence of disputes and irreconcilable 
differences, the parties have separated, and are now living 
separate and apart, and intend to live separate and part for tfcc 
rest of their natural lives; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to confirm their separation 
end rake arrangements in connection therewith, including the 
settlement of all questions relating to their property rights, th. 
custody of their children end other rights and obligations grow in:* 
out of the carriage relationship, and 
VESESAS, the parties are entering into this Agreement 
of Separation to comply with Section 170 (6) of the domestic 
Halations Lew of the State of New York, in the event that either 
party subsequently desires to initiate a proceeding unior -si~ 
statute, and 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and 
of the mutual covenants and understandings herein set forth, the 
part ies covenant and ag*ee as fol lows: 
FIRST: The part ies cay and sha l l a t a l l times 
hereinafter l i v e and continue to l i v e separate and apart for the 
rost of the ir natural l i v e s , Sgch s h a l l be free free interference 
authority, and control , d irect or ind irec t , by the other as fu l ly 
^3 i f he or sh^ were single and unmarried. Subject to the 
provisions of th i s agreement, each may reside at such pl^ce or 
places as he or she nay s e l e c t , provided, however, that neither 
party shr;ll take the children beyond the Jurisdict ion of the Stat^-
of X3v: -ork without the prior consent of the other. The parties 
shal l not molest each other or compel, or endeavor to compel, the 
other to cohabit or dxe l l with hia or her, by any l ega l or ether 
proceedings for the r e s t i tu t i on of conjugal r ights or otherwise. 
SECOND: The wife covenants and represents that 
she has not incurred or contracted, nor w i l l she at any time in 
the future incur or contract, any debt, charge or l i a b i l i t y what-
soever for which the husband, his l ega l representat ives or his 
property or e s t a t e i s now or nay become l i a b l e , and the wife 
further covenants at a l l times to keep the hunbr.nd f r e e , hr.rmlor.:. 
and indemnified of and from any fend a l l dob t o , charges, &r.d 
l i a b i l i t i e s heretofore end hereafter contracted by her* 
TKIHD: The minor chi ldren, Antony G i l i e t t , 
who i s nineteen years of age end Susan G i l i e t t who Is eighteen 
years of age, who are the unenanclpated i s sue of the marriage and 
who are now both in the process of securing the ir co l l ege education, 
sha l l have the right to l i v e with e i ther of the par t i e s to this 
agreement; that each of the part ies sha l l oaintsrtn a proper hone 
for the sa id children where the chi ldren may come during their 
vecrt ion periods from co l lege Cuu -during the mr-AT r.wfr.r. 
the intent ion of the part i e s hereto, to have a amicable relat ion-
ship between the children and their parents so that the children 
may l l v e . w i t h e i ther of the part ies at the ir d i s cre t ion . 
7Crnc::: C;>e f i r s t party i 1 . y*y * — of the e;:;^. :. 
/for -ho saint3iv.n^5 rnd rupport end educatich cf the two children. 
;ntony G u i o t r and Susan Gi l l e t t while they are at c o l l a r s . 
PITCH: C>e f i r s t party arrees to pay to the second 
•\--%tyf the sum cf ~o50#CG per -cr.th, payable or. tha f i r s t day cf 
w c^h r:.r.v.h, the f i r e s paysent to be rede or. the *at» cf this «•:-.*•. 
. : , . ~r. *!-?iSir.:# he ch-11 p.oy th * secthly rantal of ar. .v;.-s.-t •. 
:r i:;;Illr.;: occupied by the second party. 
2:::CH: I t i s agreed th.-fr t*e second party w i l l rerov: 
frc:: the hose of the part ies and take up residence at -vrca l lus , 
IV.. -sr.:; that the second party trey remove fron the horse at 
."-..I-cr., *-\:'.: Ycr?:f e l l I tesa cf her personal belor.flr.?s and such 
l:o::s of furniture as she cay require for the furnishing cf her 
r\.j>:.-t:::nt. 
SZV2XCH: Che Turtles arree that the houne a t 17c 
iouth Chird Stree t , Tultcn, New York now cvrr.cd by the carries 
h-rreto, s h a l l bs continued to be owned by them and that each z\-:\ 
h.-v? PY> undivided one-half Interest In the property; tfc*t s t su'_ 
Vlr: rs tho property 1c **ld f th? croc^de * f t sr the exr-er.ces *f 
the ff]«» v l l l be divided equr.lly hcti-wn *.hf* : / T U M , % 
SIGI-TK: Vho f i r s t *\orty rfro*!i thr.t h* V:11J ••:;.-.-:•• 
-r^vidc for , or rr.lnt^ln a policy cf lnrurrrce tc csre fcr e l l 
medical, hosp i ta l , doctor and dental expenses of the two 
children cf thr nr.rrir^e. 
Ki:.1H: It Is srreed that the p o l i c i e s of insurr-r.ee c. 
-h3 l i f e of the f l r r t party shr11 be continued, that the 
Trcaiuci shr l l be paid by the f i r s t part end that pol icy shall 
z~z be crnccl led at any tir.e and the f i r s t party agrees that zr.i 
l-eneficiary on the said pol icy shal l not he chunked. 
T"^r.!:: In the event tr./t m #.ctir,n for <*\-t'.r:*. 1?. 
inst i tuted i t any t l c c hereafter by e i ther ncrty p.rsi'-.-t '/:..-
•*:h:r ir. th is cr ?ny other rtro* or country, th* rer t l e? r.;r'.tc 
r "r'V1 «V.«*t they :l.-i*il lie l/-v.rnl l;y >»"! t'~.'; V-r-ni •>" *-.• V • -.-•;•;.:. 
r.r.i s*".«s this: o^re^rr^nt shall not be -er:red In Any ••'.*cr:-; or 
sane and shall bo forever binding and conclusive on the parties, 
and nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the 
decree or Judrnent In any such action frca Incorporating in full 
or in substance the teres of this a^reezent. 
ELZVZ27TH: Zach of the parties, on rzc;^-'*. 
arrets further at any t i se end frcn tir.e to tine to salce, execute, 
end deliver a l l instruments necessary to effectuate the provision 
of tr.is a grcedent# 
EC VI2X3SS *KZ220?f the parties hereto have hereunto 
3^: their respective hands and seals the day and year f i rs t above 
Xonica Collen-Jones Cillett 
S?AC3 a? ^.v' ^0?JC) 
C X ^ OF CSVCCO ) ££ : 
ci:^ c? cswzco ) 
Cn this ' ' / " ' d a y oi)//ti-i-rf , 1970, before ze 
personally ca=e JA:-2S AJ.TKCKY GILLS!?, tc se known end knows tc 
=e to be the sane person described in and who executed the fore* 
-cinT instrument, and he duly acknowledged to ne that he 
o::acused the sane. ^ 
'"tfr./f: fi/(; 
/ • / / :v"c:«2^  PUBLIC 
ww^...-- v*j o;v.:w»' J c o l 
v # J - - v^r wSt t * iGO J „ 
-"' ^ / ^/// / 
On this v/ day cf / / /r / , /
 f 1970, before ce 
personally case ::0!CICA C0LIZS-J0SES CILLZTT, to ce !cnown and 
known to ce to* be the sane person described In and who executed 
the foregoing lnstrurnent, and she duly acknowledged to ne that 
she executed the same. 
}yv:;.ix :-ULLIC 
UNITED MEXICAN STATES ) 
STATE OF CHIHUAHUA ) 
CONSULATE OF THE UKITED ) sat 
STATES OF AMERICA ) 
AT CIUDAD JUAREZ ) 
I, Jamee M. Hall, Consul of the United Statee of America 
at Ciudad Juares, Chihuahua, Mexico; duly coBniaaioned and 
qualified do hereby ceHifjr that Lorenso Holguin Ciaaeroa and 
Redolfo Silva, whose true signatures and official seals are 
respectively, subscribed and affixed to the annexed document, 
vere on the 2 5 day of *PWL 1970, the date thereoft res-
pectively, Judge and Secretary of the First Civil Court, (Jues 
y Secretario del Juzgado Friaero de lo Civil), Bravoe District, 
Ciudad Juares, Chihuahua, Mexico, duly commissioned and qualified, 
to whose official acta, faith and credit are due* 
The Consulate assumes no responsibility for the contents 
of the annexed document, nor for the validity of thia document, 
nor for its acceptability in any state in the united States. 
IN WITNESS THEREOF I have hereunto • et my hand and affixed 
the teal of thia Consulate at Cixxiad Juarei, Chihuahua, Htxioo, 
thia 3 0 day of
 aMm 1970. 
Item No* AS 
Fee $2.50 
Holguiaft 
•MB RON. IO& X> flILVA, CLBBX OF THE/FIRST C L COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF 
ttRAVOS, STATE OF CHIHUAHUA, REPUBLIC 6P-MEXICO, C E R T I F I E S:That in 
tl.c suit for nacassary divorca instituted by MR. J. ANTHONY GILLETT aga-
inst >I£S. MONICA MAY COLLEN-JONES VGILLETT a judgment was pronounced 
worued as follows: -----------------------------------————— — — — 
J u D G M £ N T: City of Juarez, Chihuahua, April 28, 1970.- That in the 
suit for nacassary divorce instituted by MR. J. ANTHONY GILLETT against 
::3S- MONICA MAY COLLEN-JONES GILLETT, (DOCKET 4055/970) came up for 
trial, and, IT APPEARING: By petition dated in this City on this 27th. 
day of the instants, MR. J. ANTHONY GILLETT. expressly submitting to the 
jurisdiction of this Court, filed suit for necessary divorce against 
his wife, MRS. MONICA MAY COLLEN-JONES GILLETT, alleging as grounds for 
divorce incompatibility of temperaments, and also, stating: That the mar-
riage was contracted on May 7, 1938 in. Banstaad, Surrey, England, as appe-
ars from the testimonial information.offered: That from this marriage 
taore are two children, to wit: SUSAH. and ANTONY,- who are under the cus-
tody of the mother, and. the partd.eeJfceTe* signed a Separation Agreement 
executed on March 31, 1970 in 0swaoov7-&ew York, United States of America, 
praying that aaae be approved and confirmed ixt all its parts and made a 
part of this decree, as though nereui. s«t iorth in full, but it is not 
surged in it, but survives the same, and the parties thereto are to be 
or do rod to ,ccm»ly-^tIfcJ««£10^ its terms at all times and places.- THE SUIT 
WAS ENTSRI Til fa iTirrTtfUtf iiViiihn the defendant, and the plaintiff, MR. J. 
ANTHdNY GI^iSIHWH^Bfilteon^lly appeared before the undersigned judi<s, 
;%% CII.J hia !^9^|B^tfS^S^fled of the order wharoby the same was ente-
red and he stated*.TbA*her ratifies said petition in all its parts, includt-
ing hia express snoattssiep to the jurisdiction of this Court. By writ 
dated in this Citron this 27th. day of the instants, MR. FERNANDO R. DEL-
UUM2.V7, as Attorney in fact for the defendant, MRS. MONICA MAY COLLEN-JONEfc 
GILLETT. answered-th* netition filed against her, confessing it in all 
tt* parts, and expressly-tttoaitting herself to the jurisdiction of this 
iVuirc, and praying for the resolution today granted, as all legal require-
ment have been met, including the payment for the publication hereof, as 
appears from tax payment certificate number: 35-65938 Issued by the 
Oollocwr1* Office of this City; and, W H E R E A S : This Court is conpe-
ll%ni
 ~
 rulc
 in .the present case, pursuant to article 23 of the Divorce 
;..;u. .:., >s*\\ \\xviiou <«xpca:i:ily submitted to the jurisdiction of this 
tihUM&ioisf tar xament*. a**ooimtf.tt:c!V»«flL,«' HL Section XIX of a r t i c l e 
3rd.
 %of the Divorce Lav, and the d*fondant? hiving acnu.'ccea v ie p e u u c m 
thereto In a l l I t s parts , was proved According to a r t i c l e 370 of the Code 
of C iv i l Procedure!, supplementally a o o l i e d . - I t appearing from the f t t l * 
t ion that from t h i s marriage there are two children who are under the cue-
cody of the mother, and in accordance with a r t i c l e 14 of the Divorce taw, 
sa id minor children w i l l remain in the same s i tuat ion as a t the present . 
The Separation Agreement executed between the part ies must be approved es 
requested . - Therefore and based on art ic les . .1* 2. 10, 37, 43, 44 and 45 
of the Divorce Law invoked, i t i s : D E : R E E D: FIRST:- The marriago con 
tracted by and between MR. J, ANTONY GTTXET* with MRS. MONICA MAY COLLEN-
JONES GILLETT on May 7, 1938 in Ban s tead , Surrey, England, i s hereby'decla 
red d isso lved with a l l i t s l eaa l - consequences, leaving both part ies l e g a l 1 
frca to remarry.- SECOND:- The minor children born of t h i s marriage, t o 
w i t : SUSAN and ANTONY, w i l l remain under- the custody of the mother.-
THIRD t - I t i s approved and confirmed i i ^ a i x * i t s parts the Separation Agre-
ement executed oa> March 31, 1970 1* asWga^Ne**¥ork, United s t a t e s of 
America, i s here&BSiMe. a part of t h i s decr**„ as though herein s e t forth 
In f u l l ^ b u t I t - i e ^ n o t merged* ix* i t , but^aurvives th&.sone and the part ies 
thereto are hereby ordered to comDlvwith*itr on i t s terms a t a l l t i a M 
and places.— FOURTH:- Record ana oubllsh*thim/ludcmisoat i s sue to the par t i i 
concerned, c e r t i f i e d froplfc'W requested^and In due. time f i l e records as 
* «oloqed*-matU t ^ JJ l i iEKj^JH^ *** * < » - Attorney Lorenmo 
ttolgutti £lftMfifffltiMMifil^t&iIflR£2it: Clvil^Court. a l l the d i s t r i c t of Bravon 
1 » t t a s * j ^ * E r ; r w ^ ^ g g e ^ R«SSllMU-Signaturoa^"»' • • •-•««.--«»«.-«»».»-•-^—•• 
O R D R R^  OLty.o^JtoreJtv^Chihuahua, Apri l 28* 1974^-That in view o f 
the express conf oArcey o£"the3*part±*s with, the decree today granted l a 
t h i s s u i t which d i s so lved the matrimonial, bonds e x i s t i n g between J,ANTHONY 
GILLETT'with MRS. JMEZCA MAY COLLEN-JONES GILLETT. i s declared an executed 
decree^ccording tagU»+~ Thus ordered:afc<fcsigned*the Hon. Judge of the 
F i r s t c r v u r courtr asis i ie D i a e s i c e o c B ^ V * ^ , } * ! ^tteal^- .L.-Holguin C - R. 
> 1 1 V * » " 9 4 9 Q « \ f f N » ' • • " ' • • • • • • • • • • • • < • • • 
THIS TRUB. AND CORRECT COPY TAKEN FROM ITS*ORIGINAL, IS ISSUED TO INTERESTS 
PARTY, IN THIS LEGAL FOLIO, DULY COLLATED; IS AUTHORIZED AND SIGNED AT 
CIUDAD JUAREZ, CHIHUAHUA, MEXICd, ON THIS TWENTY EIGHT DAY OF APRIL NINE-
TEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY. I ATTEST.-
THE CLERK, RODOLFO SILVA.- Signed 
SEEN FOR APPROVAL 
THE HON. JUDGE OF THE FIRST CIVIL COURT 
ATTY. LORENZO IIOLSH'TO ^ T C M M « - ** ^ 
X JDED' SEPARATION AGREEMENT 
THIS AMENDED AGREEMENT, mad* tnis 7, W day of September/ 1977 
between JA**ES ANTHONY GILLETT, of American Lake, Washinaton, hereinafter 
referred to as the Husband and MONICA COLLEN-JONES GILLETT, of High Acres 
ApartmentS/ 108A Ball Poad. Svracusr. Hev York, hureinaf^r referred to 
as the Wife? 
W I T N E S S E T H i 
WHEREAS, the parties nereto entered into a Separation Agreement aatea 
the 31st day of March/ 1970# duly acknowledged in accordance with the law 
by James Anthony Gill^tt, the HusLanc, on the 31st day of March/ 1970 and 
Monica Collen-Jones Gillett, on the 31st day of larch, 1970; and 
WHEPJBAS, the parties are desirous of amendirg such Separation Agree-
ment only as it affects the alimony payable to the Wife and the arrears in 
such payment by the Husband as of this date# and 
WHEREAS, an action was broua^t in Sucreme Court. Countv of Onondaga, 
State of New York, by the Wife against the Husband on or about the 22nd 
day o* Julyf 1975 and that such action was on the Day Calendar of such 
Courtt and 
WHFBEAS, as a result thereof, the parties hereto are desirous of 
amending their Separation Agr^erent entered into cm the 31st dav of March/ 
1970 and therefore entered into a Stipulation in open Court with their 
counsel present as to the future payments of *uch, alimony by the Husband to 
the Wife and also as to the payment: or a n arrears TO such alimony. 
MOW# THEREFORE/ in consideration of the preirises and the mutual 
promises and undertakings herein contained and"for oth^r oood »nd valuable 
consideration, receipt whereof is hrrehy acknowledged/ the parties agree 
as follows: 
l. Tnat paragraph FIFTH of tne parties Separation Agreement dated 
jtwahand •h*n B*V to > * Wife $800.00 per moftth; 50.00 for her supoort 
and maintenance and $150.00 for her rental. That it is agreed upon by the 
parties that this $150.00 rental shall not increase in amount due to an 
inflation in the economy, J.ut that the Husband's payments each and every 
month shall be $800.00 per month. Such payments to be made on the 1st day 
o£ each month.to include the month of September, 1977. 
2. That the Husband acknowledges the fact that he is in arrears in 
hi* surport payments to thf r,rifs or*? '. ecausc of this > y.z acrcsd, through 
his Attorney in open Court, that the Wife may take a Judgment of $4,000.00 
which represents $3,000.00 in arrert^ r on the Separation Agreement up to 
July 1# 1977 and $1/000.00 on arrears from July 1, 1977 to September 1, 
1977, That the Wife will withhold from entering sucia Judgment unti] 
April 1, 1978. That if the Husband should-sell, his "home in Fayetteville, 
North Carolina prior to April 1, 1970 he will pay to the Wife, out of the 
proceeds of such sale the $3#000.00 on such Judgment. That the Husband 
agrees further to pay the $1#000.00. in arrears, for July .and August 
immediately,, along with'the September payment of $800.00. 
3. The parties hereto reiterat-, reallege and reaffirm all the 
agreements as previously set out in the Separation Agreement dated tin 
31st day of March, 1970. 
STATS OF WASHINGTON ) 
COUHTY OF PIERCE ) ss.: 
On this 24th day of October 1S77, before re personally 
individuals described , and who executed the fore ing Instrument and 
he duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
GREGORY B. CURWEtf 
Notary Public in ths 
State of Washington 
Commission expires 12-13-73 ^oTA?V pjrfSc 
STATL OF KEW YORK ) 
COUNTY OP ONONDAGA) SS . : 
On this 3?>rici day of „..\J.«./»r) ''•'*•' '*' # 1977, before me personally 
cane MONICA COLLEN-JOKFS GILLETT, to n.e known and known to me to be one 
of the individuals described ir. and vfto executed the foregoing Instrument, 
and she duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
MARY LEE DETV/.LE* V/?fl4<-/ *f/f /J/f ^ ^ ^ W 
|atmyA-A»JI 
ELLIOTT LEVINE (USB #1939) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-653? 
B*N L%*n COIISMV Utah 
M\H 2 01987 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONICA GILLETT, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JAMES ANTHONY GILLETT, 
Defendant, 
ORDER PURSUANT TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 86-6436 
JUDGE: JAMES S. SAWAYA 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment having come on 
regularly for hearing on the 15th day of December, 1986 before 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, the parties' respective counsel 
having been present and having set forth their positions by way 
of written memorandum and oral argument, the Court being fully 
aware of all aspects of this matter and having taken the matter 
under under advisement, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED th&t Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment be, and is hereby, denied, the Court finding that there 
appears to be an ambiguity in the underlying agreements 
concerning the duration of Defendant's obligation to pay the 
Plaintiff. This ambiguity presents a factual issue which can 
000060 
only be resolved by parol evidence as to the parties' original 
intent. 
Dated this *tr& day of January, 1987. 
S. SAWAYA, 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Randy S. Ludlow #2011 
Attorney for Defendant 
311 S. State Street, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JILL BARNES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J. PATRICK BARNES, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. D86-4557 
Judge James Sawaya 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come on for 
hearing before the Honorable James Sawaya, Judge of the 
above-entitled court on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration on the 24th day of October, 1988; the 
plaintiff being present, however her attorney of record, 
Elliott Levine was not present before the court; defendant's 
attorney, Randy S. Ludlow being present before the court and 
having heretofore filed with the court a Motion and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the court having 
reviewed the pleadings as filed herein and based upon such 
and good cause appearing herein 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion 
for Reconsideration is denied, there being no such Motion in 
law and that the sanctions for attorney's fees as sought by 
the defendant against the plaintiff is also denied. 
DATED this day of October, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order was mailedr postage prepaid, 
this P ^ day of October, 1988, to the following: 
Elliott Levine 
4168 South 1285 West 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
